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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STERILIZATION STATUTES
Whether the year 1927 marks the turning point away from the
preservation of the natural rights and the constitutional protection of
those rights to the citizens of the United States is perhaps still a prob-
lem for future historians to determine. In that year Mr. Justice Holmes
of the United States Supreme Court decided that a Virginia statute'
providing for the sexual sterilization of inmates of institutions sup-
ported by the State who should be found afflicted with a hereditary
form of insanity or imbecility was valid and was not open to the attack
that it denied such inmates the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the 14th Amendment since "the law does all that is needed when it
does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines
and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so
fast as its means allow" and "so far as the operations enable those who
otherwise must be kept confined to be returned to the world, and thus
open the asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly
reached. ' 2
Again in 1942 the United States Supreme Court found occasion to
determine the validity of a state law3 which provided for the steriliza-
tion of habitual criminals, i.e., persons convicted two or more times for
crimes amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude, save "offenses
arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, em-
bezzlement, or political offenses." Though the court found the statute
unconstitutional inasmuch as "sterilization of those who have thrice
committed grand larceny with immunity for those who are embezzlers
is a clear, pointed, unmistakable discrimination" because the two crimes
are distinguishable only "with reference to the time when the fraudu-
lent intent to convert the property to the taker's own use" arises, the
court did cite Buck v. Bell as precedent for upholding such a legislative
enactment where proper equality in application is achieved.4
Accordingly under the decision in Buck v. BelP and Skinner v. State
of Oklahoma6 we may properly conclude that any statute permitting
sterilization of mental defectives or habitual criminals will be upheld
as constitutional and not violative of the equal protection clause of the
14th Amendment provided that no discriminatory classification is
effected as to those within the natural class designated as proper sub-
jects for its application. Sterilization laws can no longer be attack as
constituting a denial of equal protection unless discrimination is present.
I Acts 1924, c. 394, p. 569.
2 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 47 Sup. Ct. 574, 71 L.Ed. 1000 (1927).
3 Okla. St. Ann. Tit. 57, 171 et seq.; L. 1935, p. 94 et seq.
4 Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, Atty. Gen. of Oklahoma,
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State courts are bound in principal by the decisions of the supreme tri-
bunal of the land when it has spoken upon that for which it is con-
stituted to decide, and are therefore controlled by its decisions in deter-
mining whether a statute before it violates the equal protection clause
of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.7
Unfortunately most courts in determining whether such enactments
are valid have utterly neglected to inquire whether the state can pro-
ceed to deny one of his natural right to bodily integrity by means of
sterilization. In Buck v. Bell8 it was said, "The principle that sustains
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian
tubes." But the principle sustaining compulsory vaccination is confined
to the rule that a state may limit personal freedom in any reasonable
manner for the protection or promotion of public health.e Though it is
true that sterilization may promote public health insofar as it will, in
theory at least, rid society of the birth of mental unfortunates of
eugenic origin, the solution cannot be designated reasonable, unless we
are to concede that the state has a right to mutilate innocent subjects
and consequently concede that man exists only for the good of the
State. Certainly if man exists but for that purpose there can be no
rational basis in the enactment of laws to secure to him the due process
of law when called upon to render account to the State but the presence
of an empty Constitutional provision. The entire framework of our
constitutional system must of necessity collapse as must any govern-
ment which proceeds upon a materialistic conception of man.
Perhaps it was the foresight of things to come that prompted at
least one court to state its attitude upon the inherent dangers of laws
allowing sterilization of unfits when it said in extenso, "While the case
raises the very important and novel question whether it is one of the
attributes of government to essay the theoretical improvement of soci-
ety by destroying the function of procreation in certain of its members
who are not malefactors against its laws, it is evident that the decision
of that question carries with it certain logical consequents having far-
reaching results. For the feeble-minded and epileptics are not the only
persons in the community whose elimination as undesirable citizens
would, or might in the judgment of the legislature, be a distinct benefit
to society. If the enforced sterility of this class be a legitimate exercise
of governmental power, a wide field of legislative activity and duty is
thrown open to which it would be difficult to assign a legal limit.
"If in the present case we decide that such a power exists in the case
of epileptics, the doctrine we shall have enunciated cannot stop there.
7Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah 80, 276 Pac. 921 (1929).8 Supra.
OJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643, 3 Ann.
Cas. 765 (1905).
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For epilepsy is not the only disease by which the welfare of society at
large is injuriously affected, indeed, it lacks some of the gravest dangers
that attend upon such diseases as pulmonary consumption and com-
municable syphilis. So that it would seem to be a logical necessity that,
if the legislature may under the police power theoretically benefit the
next generation by the sterilization of the epileptics of this, it both may
and should pursue the like course with respect to the other diseases
mentioned with the additional gain to society thereby arising for the
protection of the present generation from contagion and contamination.
Even when these and many other diseases that might be named have
been included, the limits of logical necessity have by no means been
reached.
"There are other things besides physical and mental diseases that
may render persons undesirable citizens or might do so in the opinion
of a majority of a prevailing legislature. Racial differences for instance,
might afford a basis for such an opinion in communities where that
question is unfortunately a permanent and paramount issue. Even
beyond all such considerations it might be logically consistent to bring
the philosophic theory of Malthus (sic) to bear upon the police power,
to the end that the tendency of population-to outgrow its means of
subsistence should be counteracted by surgical interference of the sort
we are now considering."' 0 The Skinner case likewise noted the dan-
gers of allowing such laws to become tools for purposes of oppression
but went nb further than to state that such possible abuse gave greater
cause for careful scrutiny in determining whether actual discrimination
was present."
Without resort to judicial opinion it should be clear to reasonable
men who retain that proper respect for human dignity and personal
independence as is necessary for the preservation of a well ordered
society that eugenic sterilization of mental incompetents and criminals
is a direct attack by the state upon an absolute right of the individual,
namely, the right to his faculties. Though imbeciles and hopelessly dis-
eased have no right to procreation, the public authority is doing wrong
in destroying their procreative faculty for the right to the faculty
itself is absolute. The right of the state to rid itself of individuals who
are a standing danger, morally or physically, to the community cannot
be extended beyond the power of segregation. Economlic considerations
cannot be tolerated unless the traditions and philosophy from which
10 Smith v. Bd. of Examiners of Feeble-Minded, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 AUt. 963 (1913).
m Supra.
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the Founding Fathers drew for inspiration in formulating that cher-
ished document known as our Constitution are cast aside.
12
Even conceding that the state had the requisite authority to sterilize
a human being for eugenic reasons the avowed purpose of sterilization
laws would still remain unaccomplished. Society would not be benefited
by turning loose degenerates after sterilization. Indeed, it would be an
inducement for certain degenerates to commit their crimes with an
added sense of security. Where one is guilty of repeated criminal acts
he has no place in a societal union. Segregation under supervision of
competent authorities is the only proper remedy, and if so confined
there is no cause for fear that more of his kind will be propagated
(if it be true that criminals procreate criminals), and removal of many
dangers to society arising from the freedom of the unfit is realized.
Segregation is the only rightful way of preventing the use of the pro-
creative faculty of the weak-minded and criminals.
In Buck v. Bell"3 it was said, "It is better for all the world, if instead
of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly
unfit from continuing their kind." Indeed! Upon what theory of law
or morality can it be said the state possesses the power to execute an
irresponsible person for even the most heinous crime? Has the meting
of punitive measures sunk to such depths as to execute one who has
come into the world without possession of his natural reason? And if
it is sought to sterilize to, prevent offspring who will starve for their
imbecility what reason is there to make barren the imbeciles of the
rich? Definitely, the answer to such rationalization can be but one-
economic considerations. Under such theories human law and morality
become conflicting norms of action and human individuality must sur-
render to the might of the State. How inconsistent with present ideals!
ROBERT SCHEFFER.
12 Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776. "We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness-That to secure there rights, Governments are instituted
among men...
23 Supra.
